How do the Russians feel about 9 11

NATO after 9/11: the US perspective

While contingency planning for a number of contingencies related to Russia remains an important aspect of Allied Command Operations (ACO) planning, it is not the main Alliance-related issue that NATO must address. The possible rise of Iran as a nuclear power with ballistic missiles that can reach Europe must also be highlighted in accordance with the core tasks of defense and deterrence set out in Article 5.

However, in today's world, defense of the sovereign territory must also include critical infrastructure protection, impact management, planning to thwart an EMP (electromagnetic pulse) attack, energy security aspects, and cyber operations.

Obviously, not all cyber attacks can be counted as an alliance case according to Article 5. The question therefore arises as to when and how a cyber attack or an attack on the energy infrastructure is related to a state-supported emergency, in which the defense of NATO assets grows into a problem that actually becomes the declaration of an alliance case under Article 5 made necessary.

In this regard, there is concern about the possible link between state-sponsored attacks on NATO and the non-state armed groups tasked with carrying out such an attack. This can be done either to disguise the origin of the attack or to complicate NATO deliberations on how to respond to such an attack. An example is the support of Hezbollah by Iran, although there is no consensus within NATO about the threat to the interests of the alliance Iran poses.

In the cyber area, too, there is the possibility of attacks by non-state actors supported by nation states, as recently seems to have been the case with attacks on the security networks of the USA and NATO.

For the alliance, the question arises to what extent attacks of this kind can impair security interests. Even assuming that the origin of the attacks can be identified, the question arises of how to deal with these attacks - in times when NATO members are not always aware of the use of military force (let alone preventive action). agree.

During the discussions on the new Strategic Concept of NATO, the problem of an IND (improvised nuclear device) explosion as part of a terrorist attack in a European city was discussed. Preventive action would be an important aspect of contingency planning for such a scenario. But it was difficult to reach an agreement on the implementation of any preventive action, let alone the use of armed force to prosecute the perpetrators if the origin of the attack was established. The problem is that preventive action depends on “fine” intelligence and that NATO relies on its member states for intelligence from all sources.