Why is quantum philosophy so deep

Philosophy and Quantum Physics - From the decoding of emergent phenomena to the world formula

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel:[1][2][3][4] "Theoretical philosophy is the science of the highest and most unconditional causes of everything conditioned, of whose reality we otherwise have certainty. With the help of abstract principles and concepts, existence should be found, it should be explored what things are in their true and hidden reality should be taken; the tool that philosophy uses for its exploration of things are concepts, abstract principles, conclusions from concepts and the bridge to those hidden things is again built from nothing but concepts. The supreme principle is immediate, not derived; it should be certain for itself, that is only I. There is nothing more than the I everywhere; and I is there because it is there: what is there is only in the I and for I. I am the source of categories and ideas, it is what connects them. This I must be the absolute principle. It is the condition of pure self-consciousness and this pure se Self-consciousness, I, is the true essence and the absolute, but regardless of this it is conditioned and its condition is that it proceeds to a real consciousness which in this relationship of conditionedness to one another remain absolutely opposed to one another. This mystery has its revelation in itself; for Dasein has its necessity in this concept because it is the spirit that knows itself, that is, in its essence it has the moment to be conscious and to represent itself objectively. It is the pure ego, which in its alienation, in itself as a general object, has the certainty of itself, or this object is for it the penetration of all thought and all reality. How should such a principle be evoked and understood in consciousness, which is necessary if it is a condition for understanding the whole of philosophy? The absolute is to be constructed for consciousness, that is the task of philosophy, but since producing and the products of reflection are only limitations, this is a contradiction. The mediation of this contradiction is philosophical reflection. Our perception has the whole of the object before it, our reflection distinguishes, grasps different sides, recognizes a diversity in them and divides them. The reflection is that of going beyond the concrete immediate and determining and separating the same. The separation is the reflection in general, the appearance of the one in the other.

The separation, from which the working spirit proceeds, of being-in-itself, which becomes the material that it processes, and of being-for-itself, which is the side of working self-consciousness, has become objective in his work. Reflection, however, cannot express the absolute synthesis in a sentence, namely if this sentence is to count as an actual sentence for the understanding; it must separate what is one in absolute identity and express the synthesis and the antithesis separately, in two sentences, in one identity and in the other the division. His further endeavors must go to abolish this separation of the soul and the body, to clothe and shape the former in itself, but to animate it. But it must just as much go beyond these separating determinations and relate to them first. From the standpoint of relationship, the antinomy (antinomy) of these comes to the fore. As reason, reflection has relation to the absolute and it is only reason through this relation; reflection annihilates itself and everything that is and limited by relating it to the absolute. Natural consciousness has the concrete as its object, but the understanding divides, distinguishes, clings to the finite determinations of thought; and the difficulty is to grasp and hold onto the oneness. When empiricism seems to enter into conflict with theory, it usually turns out that one as well as the other has a previously contaminated and abolished view and false reason and what claims to be empirical, only the weaker in abstraction and That is what has not taken out, distinguished and fixed its limitations with less self-activity, but is caught in those which have become established in general education, are present as common sense and therefore seem to have been taken up directly from experience. Between such a firmly established perversion of perception and the abstractions that have only now been fixed, the picture of the dispute is necessarily as variegated as it is itself; Each one uses against the other now an abstraction, now a so-called experience, and it is empiricism on both sides, which is broken by empiricism and limitation, which is shattered by limitation, - sometimes a great deal with principles and laws against philosophy and the exclusion of them as one incompetent judge of such absolute truths into which the intellect has got stuck, soon an abuse of them for reasoning and an appeal to them.

First of all, it should be noted that the mystical is certainly something mysterious, but only for the understanding, simply for the sake of the fact that the abstract identity is the principle of the understanding, while the mystical is the concrete unity of those determinations which are only in the understanding their separation and opposition to be true. Fichte's most absolute, unconditional principle is: A = A positing; the second is opposition; this should be partly conditional, partly unconditional, thus the contradiction in terms. This is a departure of external reflection, which just as well again negates that with which it begins as an absolute; the opposition is the negation of the first identity, as it at the same time expressly makes its second unconditioned something conditioned. Now, as we have seen, abstractly intelligent thinking is so little fixed and ultimate that it turns out to be rather the constant annulment of itself and the turning into its opposite, whereas the rational as such consists precisely in the opposite as to contain ideal moments in oneself. Everything reasonable is thus to be called mystical at the same time, which only means that the same goes beyond the understanding and in no way that the same is to be regarded as inaccessible and incomprehensible to thought. It is necessary to know exactly what this expression means, which is otherwise often used as a catchphrase; it is to be understood by this in general as the abstracting and thus separating understanding that persists in its separations. Logic cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection or rules and laws of thought, for they make up part of their content and have to be justified only within it. In so far as subjective thinking is our most own, innermost doing and the objective concept of things constitutes the thing itself, we cannot get out of that doing, not stand above it, and just as little can we go beyond the nature of things. In whatever expressions or expressions the understanding grasps when it struggles against the unity of being and nothing and appeals to what is immediately present, in this experience itself it becomes nothing but certain being, being with a limit or Negation, to find that unity that he rejects. Reflection as understanding is in and of itself incapable of grasping the transcendental intuition, and if reason has also penetrated to self-recognition, then reflection turns the rational, where it is given space, back into an opposite. Every being, because it is posited, is opposed, conditioned and conditioned; the mind completes these its limitations by setting the opposite limitations as the conditions; these require the same completion and its task expands to infinite. The reason for that idea that has become general is to be sought in the insight into the necessary conflict between the determinations of the understanding and itself.

The spirit must have the opposite, the principle of dualism therefore belongs to the concept of spirit, which, as concrete, has the difference to its essence. That simple, ordinary dialectic is based on holding on to the opposition between being and nothing. But the liberation from the antithesis of consciousness, which science must be able to presuppose, raises the determinations of thought above this fearful, incomplete standpoint and demands the consideration of them as they in and for themselves, without such restriction and consideration, the logical, the pure -are sensible. Thought would be transcendent if these determinations of universality, cause and effect were predicated of the object; one would transcend from the subjective into another. The rational must be deduced according to its specific content, namely from the contradiction of certain opposites, the synthesis of which is the rational; only the intuition which fills out and maintains this antinomial is the postulable. The concept of pure science and its deduction are therefore presupposed in the present treatise insofar as the phenomenology of mind is nothing other than its deduction. His task now is to remove the opposition between transcendental and empirical consciousness. In general, this is done by deducing the latter from the former. The form of the two differs precisely in that what appears in empirical consciousness as an object, opposite to the subject, is posited as identical in the perception of this empirical perception, and the empirical consciousness is thereby completed by what constitutes its essence, but about what it is about has no consciousness. The thesis and antithesis and their proofs therefore represent nothing but the opposing assertions that there is a limit and that the limit is just as much only one that is abolished; that the limit has a beyond, with which it is related, where it is to go beyond it, but in which such a limit arises again, which is not one. Where the highest synthesis is expected, there always remains the same antithesis of the limited present and an infinity outside it. To grasp the absolute connection of this opposition is the profound task of metaphysics. Metaphysics is the tendency towards substance; a thinking, a unity is held fast against dualism, like being with the ancients. The true and positive meaning of the antinomies consists in the fact that everything real contains opposing determinations and that thus knowing and more closely understanding an object only means being aware of it as a concrete unity of opposing determinations.

The several propositions which are established as absolute laws of thought are therefore, viewed more closely, opposed to one another, they contradict one another and cancel one another out. But it should not cancel out; so there for I only an indefinitely prolonged time filled with restrictions, quantities, and the known progress is supposed to help out. The original identity, which its unconscious contraction - subjectively of feeling, objectively of matter - expanded into the endlessly organized juxtaposition and succession of space and time, into objective totality, and this expansion the contraction into the point that is constituted by the annihilation of the same subjective reason, which opposed subjective totality, must unite both in the perception of the absolute that becomes objective in its perfect totality. The formalism which philosophy has accused and vilified in recent times and which has re-created itself in philosophy will, even if its inadequacy is known and felt, will not disappear from science until the knowledge of absolute reality has become perfectly clear about its nature is. One and the same cause produces being knowable in the merely knowable part of the world, and knowing in the part that knows. Everything that is knowable must itself bear the stamp of the knower, i.e. of the understanding, of the intelligence, even if it is not the knower itself. Knowledge is in fact their unity; but in cognition, Kant always has the knowing subject as an individual in his sense. To begin with, knowledge is analytical; for it the object has the form of isolation, and the activity of analytical cognition is aimed at reducing what is present to it to a universal. Many say that cognition can do nothing more than break down the given concrete objects into their abstract elements and then consider them in their isolation. Consciousness observes; That is, reason wants to find and have itself as a being object, as a real, sensibly present mode. In searching cognition, the method is likewise posited as a tool, as a means on the subjective side, through which it relates to the object. In this conclusion, the subject is one extreme and the object the other extreme, and the latter, through its method, joins the latter but not in this respect for itself with itself. The extremes remain different, because subject, method and object are not posited as the one identical concept; the conclusion is therefore always the formal one; the premise in which the subject puts form as its method on its side is an immediate determination and therefore contains the determinations of form, as we have seen, of definition, division, etc., as facts found in the subject.

The anthropological and psychological side of knowing, however, concerns its appearance, in which the concept is not yet this for itself, an objectivity equal to it, i.e. H. to have oneself as an object. It immediately becomes clear, however, that this is a reversal of things and that the cognition which wants to take things as they are comes into contradiction with itself. Likewise, of cognition, the self-grasping of the concept, not the other forms of its presupposition, but only that which is itself an idea, are to be dealt with in logic; but this is necessary to consider in it. But if absolute truth is the object of logic and truth as such is essential in knowledge, then knowledge should at least be dealt with. According to the Kantian result, it is the peculiar substance of metaphysics that leads it into contradictions, and what is insufficient in cognition consists in its subjectivity; according to the Jacobian result, it is the method and the whole nature of cognition itself that only grasps a connection between conditionality and dependency and therefore what is in and for itself and absolutely true shows itself inappropriately. For that which is supposed to prove something is itself something presupposed, consequently something in need of proof, so that in this field one arrives from presuppositions to presuppositions and ends up in the progress towards infinity. The external starting point for Jacobi is more French philosophy and German metaphysics, Kant started more from the English side, Humean skepticism. Jacobi, like Kant in his negative behavior, had in front of him and considered the objective of the mode of knowledge; he declared knowledge according to its content to be incapable of knowing the absolute. Since the interest of Kantian philosophy was directed towards the so-called transcendental of the determinations of thought, the treatise of these itself came out empty-handed; what they are in themselves, without the abstract, equal relation to all I, their determinateness towards and their relationship to one another has not been made an object of consideration.

The dissolution of the antinomies is, transcendental, that is, it consists in the assertion of the ideality of space and time, as forms of perception, in the sense that the world in itself is not in contradiction with itself, not something that is canceled out, but only consciousness in its contemplation and in the relation of intuition to understanding and reason is a self-contradicting being. The so-called world, however, it is called the objective, real world or, according to transcendental idealism, subjective looking and sensuality determined by the category of understanding, therefore does not lack contradiction anywhere, but cannot endure it and is therefore exposed to arising and perishing. Two relates X and Y behave in the opposite direction if and only if X is identical with not -Y and Y is identical with not -X. Both determinations are then identical with not being the other. The difference "X is not Y" is transformed into opposition if the following applies: "X is identical to not -Y" and "Y is identical to not -X". The union of the opposite determinations as in the existing substratum constitutes the infinite regress of causes to causes. With effect it is immediately the same case, or rather the infinite progress from effect to effect is whole and the same as the recourse is from cause to cause.That first cause, which acts first and receives its effect back in itself as a counteraction, thus reappears as a cause, whereby the work that ends in the finite causality in the bad-infinite progress is bent over and becomes a returning, an infinite reciprocal action . The progress is a repetition of one and the same, setting, canceling and replacing and canceling, an impotence of the negative, that which it cancels, through its canceling itself, recurs as a continuous one. The moral world view is therefore in fact nothing other than the development of this fundamental contradiction according to its various sides; it is, to use a Kantian expression here where it is most appropriate, a whole nest of thoughtless contradictions. Intuition or being are by nature the first or the condition for the concept, but for that reason they are not that which is in and of itself unconditionalRather, in the concept their reality and thus at the same time the appearance that they had as the conditional real is canceled out. As is well known, a lot of nonsense with looking has developed from this Kantian distinction between intuition and concept, and in order to save comprehension, the value and area of ‚Äč‚Äčthis has been extended to all cognition. For this progress only one immanent principle, i. H. requires a beginning from the general and the concept; but the cognition considered here lacks such, because it only pursues the formal determination of the concept without its reflection-in-itself, and therefore takes the content-determination from the given.

There is no reason of its own for the particular that occurs in the division, neither with regard to what constitutes the reason for classification, nor with regard to the specific relationship that the components of the disjunction are supposed to have to one another. It has often been shown that the infinite progress generally belongs to non-conceptual reflection; the absolute method, which has the concept for its soul and content, cannot lead into them. Kant constructed matter out of the repulsive and attractive force, or at least, as he puts it, set up the metaphysical elements of this construction. It will not be without interest to examine this construction in more detail. This metaphysical representation of an object, which seemed to belong only to experience, not only in itself, but also in its determinations, is in part remarkable in that, as an attempt at the concept, it has at least given the impetus to the more recent natural philosophy, the philosophy which is nature does not make science the basis of science as something given to the senses, but recognizes its determinations from the absolute concept; on the other hand also because that Kantian construction is still often left behind and it is considered to be a philosophical beginning and basis of physics. And so Kant brought the reconciled contradiction into the imagination, but could neither develop its true essence scientifically nor show it as what is truly and solely real. Of course, Kant pushed further forward insofar as he found the required unity in what he called the intuitive understanding; But here, too, he stops at the opposition of the subjective and the objectivity, so that he indicates the abstract dissolution of the opposition between concept and reality, universality and particularity, understanding and sensuality and thus the idea, but this dissolution and reconciliation itself in turn one that is only subjective, not one that is true and real in and of itself. This philosophy put an end to the metaphysics of the understanding as an objective dogmatism, but in fact only turned it into a subjective dogmatism, i.e. H. translated into a consciousness in which the same finite intellectual determinations exist, and the question of what is true in and of itself is given up. Kant's method is basically analytical, not constructive.

If such a so-called construction of matter had at most an analytical merit, which would be diminished by the impure representation, then the basic idea is always to be appreciated very much, to recognize matter from two opposing determinations as its basic forces. The opposites cancel each other out in their relationship, so that the result is equal to zero, but their identical relationship is also present in them, which is indifferent to the opposites, so they make one thing. Consciousness knows something, this object is essence or in-itself, but it is also in-itself for consciousness, so that the ambiguity of this truth occurs. The relation of pure insight to the unprejudiced consciousness of the absolute being has the twofold aspect that on the one hand it is the same as it is with it, but on the other hand that this in the simple element of its thought grants the absolute essence as well as its parts and gives itself existence and allows it to be valid only as his in-itself and therefore in an objective manner, but denies its being-for-itself in this in-itself. Doing is therefore not only ambiguous insofar as it is an act just as much against itself as against the other, but also insofar as it is, undivided, the doing of the one as well as the other. These two forces exist as being for themselves; but their existence is such a movement towards one another that their being is rather a pure posited being by another, that is, their being has rather the pure meaning of vanishing. These empty abstractions of the individual and the universality opposed to it, as well as of the essence that is connected with an inessential, of an inessential that is at the same time necessary, are the powers whose game is the perceiving, often so-called common sense; he who takes himself for the solid, real consciousness is in perceiving only the play of these abstractions; he is always poorest where he thinks he is richest. By drifting around by these vain beings, being thrown into the arms by one of them and, through his sophistry, now alternately trying to hold on to the one and then the precisely opposite, and to defend himself against the truth, he thinks of philosophy that he has it to do it only with thought. In fact, it also has to do with it and recognizes it for the pure beings, for the absolute elements and powers; but with this it at the same time recognizes them in their determinateness and is therefore master over them, while that perceiving understanding takes them for the truth and is sent by them from one error to the other. The semblance of unity, which still lies in the increase in the one with just as much decrease in the other, disappears here completely; a merely external success is indicated, which only contradicts the consequence of that connection, according to which one has become predominant and the other must disappear.

Consciousness has therefore rather become a riddle to itself through its experience in which its truth should become to it; the consequences of its actions are not to it its own actions; what happens to it is not for it the experience of what it is in itself; the transition is not a mere change in the form of the same content and essence, once presented as the content and essence of consciousness, the other as an object or an observed essence of oneself. To recognize the pure concepts of science in this form of forms of consciousness makes the side of their reality according to which its essence, the concept which is posited in it in its simple mediation as thinking, breaks up the moments of this mediation and presents itself according to the inner contrast. What makes the thought succumb and causes the falling of it and the dizziness is nothing else than the boredom of repetition, which one border disappears and reappears and disappears again, always one after the other and one in the other, in the hereafter this world, in which this world lets the hereafter arise and pass away and only gives the feeling of powerlessness of this infinite or this ought, which wants to and cannot become master over the finite. Each of the two qualities, taken individually, likewise remains the same sum, which is indifference; it continues from one side to the other and is not restricted by the quantitative limit that is set in it. At this point the determinations come into direct opposition, which develops into a contradiction. Each of these two parts seems to be the wrong of the truth to the other. Being-for-itself has its being-for-itself as an object, as something absolutely other and at the same time just as immediate as itself - itself as something other, not that this has a different content, but the content is the same self in form absolute opposition and completely indifferent existence of one's own. The interaction is causality itself, the cause not only has an effect, but in the effect it is connected to itself as a cause.

If the objects are only viewed as self-contained totalities, then they cannot affect one another. To postpone the interaction of the substances into a predetermined harmony means nothing more than to make it a prerequisite, i. H. to something that is withdrawn from the concept. One should know the faculty of knowledge before one knows; it is the same as wanting to swim before going into the water. The difficulty for such an understanding that wants to understand lies in the qualitative transition from something to its other in general and to its opposite; on the other hand, he mirrors identity and change as the indifferent, external aspect of the quantitative. In this movement we see the process repeated, which presented itself as a play of forces, but in consciousness. What was in that for us is here for the extremes themselves. The middle is self-consciousness, which breaks down into the extremes and each extreme is this exchange of its determinateness and an absolute transition into the opposite. This movement does not create anything new in the matter itself. But in it we now recognize what was missing in the law, namely the absolute change itself, because this movement, if we look at it more closely, is directly the opposite of itself. It makes a difference, which is not only for us is not a difference, but which it itself cancels as a difference. Not only is there a mere unity, so that no difference would be made, but it is this movement that certainly makes a difference, but because it is not one, it is canceled again. With the explanation, then, the change and change, which before was only in appearance outside of the interior, penetrated into the supersensible itself; but our consciousness has passed over from within as objects to the other side into the understanding and has change in it. This change is not yet a change of the thing itself, but rather presents itself as a pure change because the content of the moments of change remains the same. But since the concept as the concept of understanding is the same as the interior of things, this change becomes the law of the interior for it. So he learns that it is the law of appearance itself that there are differences that are not differences; or that the eponymous repels itself; and also that the differences are only those which in truth are none and cancel each other out; or that the unlike attracts itself.

For the first supersensible world was only the immediate elevation of the perceived world into the general element; it had its necessary counter-image in this one, which still retained the principle of change and change for itself; the first realm of laws lacked this, but preserved it as a perverted world. According to the law of this perverted world, what has the same name as the first is unequal to itself, and what is unequal is likewise unequal to itself, or it becomes alike. That absolute universality, which is also immediately absolute isolation and a being-in and for-itself, which is absolutely posited and only this being-in and for-itself through the unity with being posited, likewise constitutes the nature of the I, as of the concept; Nothing can be understood of the one and the other unless the two moments given are grasped at the same time in their abstraction and at the same time in their perfect unity. As this very abstract principle is fixed in extremes, the detachment of all moments is fixed, their connection is only a constant change, a never calm wandering, a wild tumult from one extreme to the other. A circle of reciprocity, through which one does not find out what the thing itself is, neither what the one nor the other. The personality is absolutely divided, and subject and predicate are utterly indifferent, who are none of their business, without the necessary unity. Instead of the opposition remaining essentially just a moment, it seems to have withdrawn from the rule of unity through the division into completely independent forces. In this connection of being and thinking there is therefore the lack that the spiritual being is still afflicted with an unreconciled division into a here and a hereafter. The beginning of philosophy must be either mediated or immediate, and it is easy to show that it cannot be either the one or the other; thus one or the other way of beginning finds its refutation.

In so far as the one object in the form of the subjective unity is posited as an active cause, this no longer applies to an original determination, but as something mediated; the acting object has this determination only through another object. The subjectivity, ego, pure will, opposed to objectivity, is in absolute opposition and the task of identity and integration simply cannot be solved. It can be said that integral calculus is merely the opposite, but generally more difficult problem of differential calculus; Rather, the real interest of integral calculus goes exclusively to the relationship between the original and the derived function in the concrete objects to one another. It is the pure change, or the opposition in itself, the contradiction of thinking. In this tautological movement, it turns out, the understanding persists in the calm unity of its object, and the movement falls only into itself, not into the object; it is an explanation that not only does not explain anything, but is so clear that, by making a move to say something different from what has already been said, it rather says nothing, but only repeats the same thing. If the equality is shown to him (the consciousness), it shows the inequality and while this, which it has just pronounced, is now held up to him, it moves on to showing the equality; his talk is indeed a bickering of stubborn boys whose one says A when the other B, and again B when the other A and who, by contradicting themselves, buy the joy of remaining contradicting one another. Precisely what is supposed to keep contradiction and resolution from them, namely that something is equal to another in one respect, but unequal in another; - this keeping equality and inequality apart is their destruction. For both are determinations of the difference; they are relationships to one another, one thing to be what the other is not; equal is not unequal and unequal is not equal; and both essentially have this relationship and apart from it have no meaning; as determinations of difference, each is what it is, as distinct from its other.

Two are linked together in such a way that they simply flee from each other, and while they flee, they cannot separate, but are linked in their mutual escape. Both have to go into this fight, because they have to raise the certainty of themselves, to be for themselves, to the truth in the other and in themselves. To remove such fixed opposites is the only interest of reason. It is not the general idea, which is in opposition and in struggle, which is in danger, it stays unattacked and undamaged in the background. This activity is the middle of the conclusion, one extreme of which is the general, the idea that rests in the inner shaft of the spirit, the other extreme is externality, objective matter. This impossibility that the ego is reconstructed from the opposition of subjectivity and the X, that it arises in unconscious production, and becomes one with its decision, is expressed in such a way that the highest synthesis that a system shows is an ought. I = I transform into: I should be the same as I, the result of the system does not return to its beginning. The natural consciousness clings to the presence and evades the new because it is unable to recognize its own truth. Other idealism, such as the Kantian and Fichte'sche, does not get beyond the ought or the infinite progress and remains in the dualism of existence and being-for-itself.Formal thinking makes identity a law for itself, lets the contradicting content it has in front of it fall into the sphere of imagination, in space and time, in which the contradicting is kept apart from one another in juxtaposition and in succession, and so without the mutual Touch occurs before consciousness.

It has been shown as the basic character of Fichte's principle that subject = object emerges from identity and is unable to restore itself to it, because the difference has been placed in the causal relationship. The principle of identity does not become the principle of the system; as soon as the system begins to form, the identity is given up. The system itself is a consistent, sensible set of finiteness, which the original identity cannot bring together in the focus of totality, for absolute self-perception. Fichte tries to unite the contradiction, but in spite of this he lets the basic damage of the dualism persist; in this way it is not dissolved, and the ultimate is only an ought, endeavor, longing. The progress into infinity is generally the expression of the contradiction, here of that which the quantitative-finite or the quantum in general contains. The scantness of this subjectively remaining elevation, which rises up the ladder of the quantitative, makes itself known by the fact that it admitted in vain work not to get any closer to the infinite goal, which to be reached, of course, has to be attacked quite differently. As a moment it is in essential unity with its other, only as determined by this its other, i.e. H. it only has meaning in relation to something related to it. Apart from this relationship, it is zero - since precisely the quantum as such is indifferent to the relationship, but is supposed to be an immediate, resting determination in it. It is proved in the following way that no beginning of the world or of something is possible: nothing can begin, neither insofar as something is nor insofar as it is not; for insofar as it is, it does not just begin; but insofar as it is not, it does not begin either. It is clear that nothing is advanced here against becoming or beginning and ceasing, this unity of being and nothing but assertorically denying it and ascribing truth to being and nothing, each separate from the other.

This dialectic is at least more consistent than reflective representation. With the assumption of the absolute separation of being from nothing, what one hears so often the beginning or the becoming is certainly something incomprehensible; for one makes a presupposition which cancels the beginning or the becoming, which one again admits and this contradiction, which one sets up and makes its resolution impossible, is called the incomprehensible. The reasoning mentioned, which makes the false presupposition of the absolute separation of being and non-being and stops at the same, is not to be called dialectic but sophistry. It can be recalled here that the dialectical movement likewise has sentences about its parts or elements; the difficulty shown always seems to return, and a difficulty of Thing itself to be. The need must arise to produce a totality of knowledge, a system of science. One of the main difficulties in studying the sciences in which this procedure is prevalent rests, therefore, on this perversity of the position of preceding as the reason what is in fact derived, and by proceeding to the consequences, in them actually only the reason The reason for those reasons should be given. This is similar to what happens in ordinary proof, that the reasons which he uses require a justification themselves, and so on indefinitely. The reason shows itself only as an appearance that immediately disappears; this emergence is thus the tautological movement of the thing towards itself, and its mediation through the conditions and through the ground is the disappearance of both. So causality presupposes itself or conditions itself.

Whoever wants to penetrate such sciences must therefore begin to inculcate those reasons; a business that comes across reason, because it is supposed to apply to the baseless as a basis. The one who gets away best is who, without much thought, accepts the principles as given and uses them from now on as the basic rules of his understanding. Without this method one cannot win the beginning; nor can one proceed without it. This, however, is hindered by the fact that in them the counter-attack of the method appears, which in what follows aims to show what is derived, but which in fact only contains the reasons for these presuppositions. Furthermore, since the following shows itself to be the existence from which the ground was deduced, this relation in which the phenomenon is performed gives a suspicion of its representation; for it is not expressed in its immediacy, but as evidence of the reason. But because the latter is in turn derived from the former, one rather demands to see it in its immediacy in order to be able to judge the reason from it. In such a representation, therefore, one does not know in which what is actually justifying occurs as a derivative, neither how one is concerned with the reason, nor how one is concerned with the phenomenon. But the real content, matter, is the sensations, the other constituent part of knowledge; neither one nor the other is something in itself, and neither together, knowledge, either, but only recognizes appearances - a peculiar contradiction. Thoroughness seems to require, above all, to examine the beginning, as the reason on which everything is built, indeed not to go further than until it has been established; on the contrary, if this is not the case, everything still to discard the following.

The main difficulty now lies in the following. Reason has to know the unconditional, the infinite. What does this mean? It means to determine the unconditioned, to derive its determinations; this is called knowledge or is to be called so. Much has been written and spoken about knowledge, cognition, etc.; but it is not defined. But in philosophy it is important that what is presupposed to be known is known; the point here is therefore that the unconditioned is known. In reason, the highest level of thinking, one should expect that the concept will lose the conditionality in which it still appears on the level of understanding and arrive at perfect truth. However, this expectation is disappointed. It is the most common self-deception, as well as the deception of others, to assume something as known when recognizing and to put up with it as well; with all the back and forth, such knowledge does not get lost without knowing what is happening to it. The subject and object, etc., God, nature, the mind, the sensuality, etc. are taken as a basis unseen as known and as something valid and constitute fixed points of both the exit and the return. The movement goes back and forth between them, which remain motionless, and thus only on their surface. So apprehension and testing also consists of seeing whether everyone can find what they have said in their imagination, whether it seems so and is known to them or not. It could only be called an occult quality in the sense that the reason is supposed to have a different content than that which is to be explained; no such is given; to that extent, however, the force used to explain is a hidden reason, as a reason as required which is not given.

Because Kant defines the behavior of reason to the categories as only dialectical, and indeed conceives the result of this dialectic simply as the infinite nothingness, the infinite unity of reason also loses the synthesis and with it that beginning of a speculative, truly infinite concept It becomes the well-known, very formal, merely regulative unit of the systematic use of the mind. This form of justification and conditioning, however, belongs to that proof from which the dialectical movement differs and thus to external knowledge. It is only here where the content of cognition as such enters the circle of contemplation, because it now belongs to the method as a derivative. Against this path in the scientific one can say, for example, because looking at it is easier than knowing, that what can be seen, i.e. concrete reality, is to be made the beginning of science and this path is more natural than that which begins with the object in its abstraction and from there, conversely, goes on to its particularization and concrete isolation. But when it is to be known, the comparison with perception has already been decided and given up; and there can only be the question of what is the first and what the consequence of knowing is supposed to be like; what is required is no longer a natural, but an epistemological path. The method (of cognition), which hereby loops in a circle, cannot, in a temporal development, anticipate that the beginning as such is already a derivative. Rostock, Kiel, Vienna: essays, contributions, reviews 1919-1925 The sciences, especially the physical ones, are filled with tautologies of this kind, which make up a prerogative of the sciences. The presentation begins with the reasons; they are put up in the air as principles and first concepts; they are simple determinations, without any necessity in and of themselves; the following is to be based on them. But here, where science first appears, neither it nor what it is has justified itself as essence or as in-itself; and without one, no examination seems to be able to take place. It is consciousness itself that tests itself and we - the philosopher who follows this course of consciousness development - are left with only pure observation. We find nature before us as a riddle and problem that we feel driven to dissolve as much as we are repelled by it. By seeing their processes and transformations, we want to grasp their simple essence, to compel this Proteus to cease its transformations and to show itself to us and to express itself so that it does not merely present us with multiple, ever new forms, but in a simpler way Bring language to the consciousness of what it is. Not only must philosophy be in agreement with the experience of nature, but the emergence and formation of philosophical science has empirical physics as a presupposition and condition.

But natural philosophy is in such unfavorable circumstances that it has to prove its existence; to justify it we have to trace it back to what is known. If it were not made more acidic for the consciousness to recognize the truth, but only had to sit on the tripod and speak oracles, the work of thinking would of course be saved. Natural philosophy takes up the material which physics prepares for it from experience at the point where physics has brought it, and transforms it again, without taking experience as the final test; Physics must work in the hands of philosophy so that it translates into the concept the intelligible general that has been handed down to it, by showing how it emerges from the concept as an inherently necessary whole. The dissolution of the dichotomy must have the form that its form is the knowing idea, and the moments of dissolution must be sought in consciousness itself. Think? Abstract? - Sauve qui peut! (Save yourself if you can!) Because metaphysics is the word, as abstract and almost as thinking, from which everyone runs away more or less like someone afflicted with the plague. It is not a question of approaching abstraction and emptiness, of taking refuge in the nothingness of knowledge; Instead, consciousness must be preserved in that we want to refute the assumptions through which the contradiction arose through ordinary consciousness itself.

This fulfillment, of which no further source can be given, has generally been regarded as the perfection of the scientific faculty; and one adds, for example, that such a state of perfect science preceded the present history of the world and that after falling away from this unity, in myths, in tradition or in other traces, some ruins and distant twilight of that spiritual state of light remained to which the further education of man in religion was linked and from which all scientific knowledge had proceeded. The general in nature are the species, the genera, the force, the gravity, reduced to their appearances. Leibniz accused the Newtonian attractive force (gravitation) of being such a hidden force as the scholastics use for the purpose of explanation. One should rather reproach it for the opposite, that it is too well-known a quality, because it has no other content than the appearance itself. In the formal business of this mode of explanation for reasons, one hears again at the same time that everything is explained from the well-known Regardless of forces and matter, say that we do not know the inner nature of these forces and matter ourselves. This increases the uncertainty, especially if the lecture is not strictly consistent but more honest, that traces and circumstances of the phenomenon reveal themselves everywhere, which point to more and often completely different things than are merely contained in the principles. Finally, the confusion becomes even greater, as reflected and merely hypothetical determinations are mixed up with immediate determinations of the phenomenon itself, when those are expressed in a way as if they belonged to immediate experience. Indeed, one finds oneself in a kind of witch's circle, in which determinations of existence and determinations of reflection, ground and justified, phenomena and phantoms run through each other in an inseparable society and enjoy equal status with each other.

The reasons are taken only from essential determinations of content, relationships, and considerations, of which every thing, just like its opposite, has several; in its form of essentiality, one is as good as the other; because it does not contain the entire scope of the thing, it is a one-sided ground, of which the other particular sides have particular aspects, and of which none of them exhausts the thing that makes up their connection and contains them all. This opposition could just as well be considered with regard to time and space itself, because whether time and space are relationships of things themselves or just forms of perception does not change anything for the antinomial of limitation or infinity in them.Should one ever have thought that philosophy would deny the truth to intelligible beings because they lack the spatial and temporal material of sensuality? Rather, it finds reason to complain about such a state of inappropriateness of its existence and its existence and of injustice, which restricts it to having its object only as a pure duty, but denies it to see it and itself realized. We can only see here the admission that this justification is completely inadequate in itself; that it itself demands something quite different from such reasons. It need not be taken as the fault of an object or of cognition that they show themselves dialectically through the nature and an external connection.

So far philosophy has not yet found its method; She looked with envy at the systematic structure of mathematics and, as I said, borrowed it from it, or made do with the method of sciences, which are only a mixture of given materials, empirical principles and thoughts, or even helped herself with the crude throwing away of all methods . The ignorance of its nature is of the opinion that this confusion is something wrong that should not be done and ascribes it to a subjective error. But the infinity of a series consists precisely in the fact that it can never be completed by successive synthesis. Hence an infinite elapsed world series is impossible, and consequently a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence; which had to be proven. The infinite proof of the premises does not resolve this contradiction, but only renews it again and again and is the repetition of one and the same original defect. Which form is thus taken in order to have a different beginning than empty being, it suffers from the deficiencies mentioned. Those who remain dissatisfied with this beginning may invite themselves to the task in order to avoid these shortcomings. The science of the subjective subject-object has hitherto been called transcendental philosophy, that of the objective subject-object natural philosophy. Both sciences seem to contradict each other, because in each the absolute is posited in an opposite form.

In order to undo the division, both opposites, subject and object, must be undone; they are canceled out as subject and object in that they are posited identically. For absolute identity to be the principle of a whole system, it is necessary that the subject and object are both posited as subject-object.In absolute identity, subject and object must not be thought of as one in such a way that ultimately nothing is available for reflection and knowledge. Philosophy must do justice to the division into subject and object; but by equating it to absolute with the identity opposed to separation, it has only posited it conditionally, just as such an identity - which is conditioned by the annihilation of the opposites - is also only relative. In that philosophy separates, it cannot position the separated without positing them in the absolute; for otherwise they are purely opposites, which have no other character than that one is not in so far as the other is. But the absolute itself is therefore the identity of identity and non-identity; Opposition and oneness are in him at the same time. Totality as basis and content is this immediacy reflected in itself only through the presupposing reflection of the form, which cancels its difference and opposes it as an indifferent identity, as a reflected unity. Both poles of knowing and being are in each one, so both also have the point of indifference in them.